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The Tax Policy Outlook for Developing Countries: Reflections on 
International Formulary Apportionment1 
 
Michael C. Durst 
 
 
Summary 
 
The author offers a retrospective analysis of his recently-completed extensive research on 
the technical feasibility of international formulary apportionment of corporate taxable income, 
as a replacement for the body of ‘arm’s-length’ transfer pricing rules generally in use around 
the world. In this retrospective analysis the author considers recent analytical work on base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) conducted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The author 
focuses especially on the needs of developing countries, which, because of problems 
associated with informal economic activity, need to rely more heavily on corporate income 
taxation than wealthier countries. The author generally agrees with the approach taken by 
both the OECD and IMF, which (i) would rely on targeted measures to curtail BEPS and 
would not seek to fully replace arm’s-length rules with a formulary system, but (ii) would 
nevertheless incorporate elements of a formulary approach in order to remedy apparent 
defects in some important aspects of current arm’s-length rules.  
 
Keywords: transfer pricing; formulary apportionment; base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS); OECD; IMF. 
 
Michael C. Durst is a long-time US tax practitioner, an author on international taxation and 
developing countries, a former government official and law professor, and an ICTD 
researcher. 
 
  
                                                 
1  This essay is based in part on an article previously published by Bloomberg BNA, copyright 2014 Tax Management Inc., 
used here with permission. 
  
 4 
Contents 
 
 Summary           3 
 Acronyms           5 
 Introduction           6 
 
1 The OECD and IMF analyses        7 
 
2 Perceived technical barriers to formulary apportionment  10 
 2.1  Concerns regarding double taxation     11 
 2.2  Problems with the sales factor      11 
 2.3  Tax treaty issues        13 
 2.4  Accounting barriers to formulary apportionment    14 
 
3 High-priority measures for developing countries   15 
 3.1  Curbs on interest deductions      15 
 3.2  Hybrid transfer pricing methods      16 
 3.3  Excise taxes        18 
 
4 Conclusion         18 
 
 References         20 
  
  
 5 
Acronyms 
 
APA  Advance Pricing Agreement 
BEPS  Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
CFC  Controlled Foreign Corporation 
CPM  Comparable Profits Method 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
NGO  Non-governmental organisation 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PE  Permanent Establishment 
TNMM  Transactional Net Margin Method 
  
  
 6 
Introduction 
 
A formulary system divides some of the income of a business group among tax jurisdictions 
according to the relative volume of the group’s observable income-producing activities within 
those jurisdictions. Under formulary apportionment the income of a group is measured on an 
aggregate international basis, and is then divided among the different group members 
according to measures of their relative levels of economic activity, such as perhaps their 
relative level of sales. The formulary approach would substitute for the current practice of 
attempting to measure each entity’s income on a separate accounting, or arm’s-length, basis, 
an exercise which requires attempts to estimate arm’s-length prices for the many 
transactions that typically occur among the different members of contemporary multinational 
groups. 
 
The formulary principle may be implemented in many different ways. Versions of it are 
employed to allocate taxing rights over companies between the states of the United States 
and the provinces of Canada. The Canadian system generally divides companies’ income 
among the provinces according to a two-factor formula. Equal weight is given to sales 
volumes and payroll expenses. The tax obligation of a company to any one provincial 
government is determined by the proportion of total company sales and payroll costs that is 
made in that province. The formulas historically employed by some US states involve sales, 
payroll expenses and the value of plant and equipment. Many US states now, though, use 
only a single factor – sales.  
 
Any variant of formulary apportionment involves a degree of arbitrariness in the allocation of 
corporate income between the company and the tax collectors, and between different taxing 
jurisdictions. The core reason for considering a formulary approach is prevention of tax 
avoidance. Currently the complexity of arm’s-length pricing has permitted many multinational 
groups to shift substantial amounts of taxable income through what the OECD has labelled 
‘base erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS), to zero- and low-tax countries where the 
multinationals conduct few if any business activities. Under a formulary system this would not 
be possible, as income could be apportioned only according to real and observable 
economic activities.  
 
Apart from considerations of tax avoidance, a formulary system could remove a good deal of 
subjectivity from the workings of the international tax rules, thereby providing greater 
economic certainty to taxpayers and governments. Under the arm’s-length transfer pricing 
rules now in use around the world, income is apportioned according to multinational groups’ 
own estimates – which are subject to review upon examination by tax authorities – of the 
levels of income that would be earned by the different affiliates of commonly-controlled 
business groups if those affiliates were not commonly controlled, but instead operated in the 
manner of independent companies transacting with one another at arm’s length. In practice 
under arm’s-length transfer pricing rules groups estimate the proper division of income 
among their affiliates based on often-elaborate analyses by professional economists, 
according to the economists’ perceptions of the different income-producing activities 
performed, assets owned, and business risks borne by the groups’ affiliates in the countries 
in which the affiliates operate. 
 
For about forty years, critics of the arm’s-length approach have argued that it allows 
multinational taxpayers excessive flexibility to use networks of contracts made among group 
members to shift income from countries in which the groups conduct the bulk of their 
business activities to other affiliates established in zero- or low-tax countries, which often 
have few employees or sales and little if any plant and equipment. The contracts used to 
effect these shifts of income include licences for the use of intellectual property held by the 
zero- or low-tax affiliates, agreements for the lending of money, and various kinds of 
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arrangements under which the low- or zero-tax affiliates are treated as bearing, in return for 
payment, group-wide business risks such as the risk of holding inventory located around the 
world.  
 
A number of months have passed since I had the opportunity of publishing a multi-part 
analysis of the potential promises and limitations of the formulary system.2 As I was 
conducting my study the OECD, in coordination with the G20 group of countries, was 
beginning its extended and still ongoing study of BEPS, the shifting of income by 
multinational companies to zero- and low-tax countries.3 The OECD began its work in 
apparent response to a series of studies by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
reports in newspapers and other media that claimed income-shifting had achieved very large 
proportions, and that substantial amounts of corporate tax revenue were apparently being 
removed annually from the tax jurisdiction of countries around the world in which 
multinational groups actually earn their incomes. 
 
Base erosion and profit shifting removes corporate tax revenue from countries at all levels of 
economic development. The media reports that seem most directly to have triggered the 
OECD BEPS study focused on the transfer of revenue from Western European countries, 
and particularly the United Kingdom.4 Nevertheless, as several reports by NGOs have 
suggested,5 the practical consequences of base erosion seem to be greatest for the lower-
income developing countries. The wealthier countries of the world typically can collect 
government revenue relatively efficiently from domestic sources like personal income taxes 
and consumption taxes. The domestic economies of lower-income developing countries, 
however, often contain large informal sectors in which business is conducted at a very small 
scale with minimal books and records maintained. The lower-income countries therefore 
have a relatively greater financial stake than wealthier countries in successful action to 
control BEPS, at least until such time as they can better develop their domestic tax base. 
 
Recognising the special importance to developing countries of efforts to control base erosion, 
in July and August 2014 the OECD issued a two-part Report to G20 Development Working 
Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries (OECD 2014a, 2014b). The IMF, 
building on the OECD BEPS effort, has released a study on the same topic which the IMF 
describes as ‘tax spillovers’ of international tax rules as they affect developing countries (IMF 
2014). The OECD and IMF reports provide a useful framework for considering both the 
potential benefits and limitations of formulary apportionment as a point of reference for 
designing international tax policies for the benefit of lower-income developing countries. 
 
This paper: (i) summarises the potential benefits of and obstacles to formulary apportionment 
as a viable tax policy instrument for developing countries, and (ii) identifies high-priority 
topics for further research and analysis. 
 
 
1  The OECD and IMF analyses 
  
Perhaps the most striking element of the OECD’s work on BEPS is the manner in which it 
articulates the root of the problem: the extent to which current tax laws permit members of 
multinational corporate groups to assign income to zero- or low-tax countries in which they 
                                                 
2  The eight instalments of the study were published by Bloomberg BNA (Durst 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2013a, 2013b, 
2013c, 2013d, 2013e). Significant portions of these instalments benefited from generous research support from the 
International Centre for Tax and Development.  
3  The OECD initiated its study with the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013). The OECD’s study 
continues at an intensive pace; results are shared at <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm>. 
4  e.g. Duncan and Cohen (2012) and Syal and Wintour (2012).  
5  e.g. ActionAid (2012). 
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conduct few if any business activities. In the words of the recent OECD report on BEPS and 
developing countries, base erosion results from ‘arrangements that achieve no or low 
taxation by shifting profits away from the jurisdictions where the activities creating those 
profits take place’ (OECD 2014a: 8). The key to curtailing BEPS therefore, in the words of 
another recent report from the G20 Group, is ‘to put an end to the divorce between the 
location of profits and the location of real activities’ (G20 2013: 4). 
  
The language used by the OECD and G20 to describe the source of the BEPS problem 
evokes the central principle of formulary apportionment: income should be attributed for tax 
purposes to the locations where business activities are performed. Because formulary 
apportionment can apportion income only to places where real business activity takes place 
and in quantitative proportion to the extent of that activity, formulary apportionment would, if 
applied to a taxpayer’s income from all sources, eliminate BEPS completely. That is, under a 
fully-implemented formulary system income could not simply be apportioned to countries 
where little if any economic activity is performed. At least in theory, therefore, formulary 
apportionment represents the most straightforward remedy for the BEPS problem. 
  
The articulation by the OECD and G20 of the principle that the geographic distribution of 
taxable income should correspond to the locations of a taxpayer’s activities helps to move 
the policy debate away from what historically has been a rather pointless ideological debate 
between proponents of arm’s-length and formulary approaches. In light of the OECD/G20 
analysis, there is no reason to think that the arm’s-length and formulary approaches to the 
international division of taxable income rest on incompatible conceptual grounds. 
  
The idea that the apportionment of income should follow the geographic locations of a 
taxpayer’s activities can indeed be seen as an apt statement of the arm’s-length principle, if 
the heart of that principle is seen as a rule of tax neutrality between the members of 
commonly-controlled corporate groups, and independent companies that must transact with 
one another at arm’s length. Under long-standing principles of nexus in international tax law, 
legal entities are subject to tax in those jurisdictions where they are physically present and 
conduct their activities.6 It is impossible under this principle for a single independent legal 
entity to arrange for its income to be subject to tax in countries other than those where 
income-generating activities occur. This result can be achieved only by members of 
commonly-controlled corporate groups through the use of the kind of related-party contracts 
that stand at the heart of income-shifting transactions. 
  
In short, by recommending an international tax system in which income is apportioned 
according to the geographic distribution of a taxpayer’s business activities, the OECD is 
seeking to move international tax laws into greater conformity with the arm’s-length standard. 
Moreover, at least in theory (an important caveat), formulary apportionment appears to offer 
a straightforward means of implementing the system the OECD wishes to bring about. 
  
Despite the conceptual appeal of formulary apportionment in addressing BEPS, both the 
OECD and IMF have ruled out devoting substantial resources in the short term to an analysis 
of formulary apportionment as a replacement for the arm’s-length principle. Both 
organisations attribute this decision to the presence of unanswered questions about the 
administrative feasibility of international formulary apportionment, as well as a formulary 
system’s possible adverse effects on the share of the global tax base apportioned to 
developing countries. 
  
 
 
                                                 
6  The most commonly-mentioned articulation of this principle, of course, is provided by the permanent establishment rules 
of all bilateral income tax treaties. 
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The OECD explains its conclusion as follows: 
 
[A]doption of alternative transfer pricing methods like formulary apportionment would 
require development of a consensus on a number of key issues (which countries do 
not believe to be attainable in the short or medium term) and could also raise systemic 
problems which could result in even more damaging problems for countries’ revenues. 
Accordingly, it is believed that it will be most productive to focus on addressing specific 
issues arising under the current arm’s length system at the present time. 
(OECD 2014c) 
 
The IMF, for its part, explains: 
 
Whatever its merits in principle, prospects for adoption of international [formulary 
apportionment] seem remote. A substantial legal and institutional infrastructure has 
been built around current arrangements, so that movement towards international 
[formulary apportionment] would likely involve considerable disruption. That might 
change if a major capital exporter were to move in that direction. But there is little 
immediate sign of that – with significant resistance within the EU, for instance, to the 
CCCTB [a pending European Union proposal for formulary apportionment to be applied 
regionally]. 
(IMF 2014: 41) 
  
Rather than suggesting a formulary approach to combat BEPS, both the OECD and IMF 
recommend a combination of targeted anti-tax-avoidance measures that would involve, 
among other items: 
 
(i) some modification of current arm’s-length transfer pricing rules;  
(ii) tightened rules to disallow deduction of interest expenses, especially when paid to 
related parties; and 
(iii) strengthened controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, by which the home countries of 
multinational groups limit the amount of income that the groups are permitted to 
accumulate through their global operations in zero- or low-tax subsidiaries. 
 
In addition the IMF notes that some elements of formulary apportionment might prove useful 
in efforts to modify current arm’s-length pricing rules, with the particular goal of simplifying 
their application in the developing country setting. In particular the IMF suggests that some 
kinds of hybrid transfer pricing methods, perhaps including ‘formulary profit split’ methods, 
might be of practical benefit to developing countries (IMF 2014: 41-42).  
 
In my view the OECD and IMF are prudent in refraining, at least at present, from 
encouraging substantial efforts to design and implement full-fledged formulary apportionment 
rules. As explored in my recently-published analysis (Durst 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2013a, 
2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e), significant technical and policy issues must be resolved before 
formulary apportionment can be implemented for international use. These questions cannot 
be resolved within the time frame in which BEPS should be curtailed, so focusing on other 
possible means of curtailing BEPS in the short term seems sensible. 
 
Moreover, in addition to technical problems, international formulary apportionment faces a 
large political obstacle. For years business groups and legislators around the world have 
strenuously opposed replacing current transfer pricing rules with a formulary system, and 
there is no indication that this opposition is weakening. The political unpopularity of formulary 
apportionment probably arises at least in part from its most important potential benefit: a 
complete elimination of opportunities for BEPS. Businesses have a direct financial interest in 
discouraging formulary apportionment and in channelling political debate instead towards 
partial measures, that unlike formulary apportionment can form the basis of political 
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compromise. Similarly, legislators – who have often displayed ambivalent attitudes towards 
corporate income taxation, especially in the international sphere – are likely to be more 
comfortable debating partial measures than the all-or-nothing remedy for BEPS that 
formulary apportionment represents. This tendency may well be present not only among 
legislators and other policymakers in the wealthier countries which are home to most of the 
multinationals that would see their tax burdens increase if BEPS were to be eliminated. In 
addition legislators and other policymakers in developing countries may be reluctant to 
entertain reforms that would entirely eliminate BEPS, out of fear that doing so could increase 
the after-tax costs of international business generally and discourage inbound investment to 
their country. In short, whatever its technical promise or limitations, international formulary 
apportionment, in part because of its potentially high degree of effectiveness in eliminating 
profit shifting, is a hard political sell in developing countries as well as the wealthier countries 
in which multinational groups tend to be based.  
 
This situation could change over the long or even medium term. It is possible, for example, 
that some developing countries will perceive their need for additional corporate tax revenue 
to justify assembling a coalition to develop and adopt a formulary system. It is also possible 
that trends in tax reform around the world will lead to a global system in which statutory tax 
rates are significantly reduced and BEPS is no longer permitted to a significant extent, 
perhaps through global adoption of strengthened CFC rules. In that situation governments 
and businesses might both find formulary apportionment attractive for its predictability and 
administrative advantages. However neither of these situations appears likely to materialise 
in the immediate future. 
 
Currently, therefore, the most useful application of technical insight into formulary 
apportionment, particularly from the standpoint of developing countries with their 
disproportionate dependence on corporate tax revenue, is to look for ideas that might be 
useful in designing incremental measures against base erosion, including hybrid transfer 
pricing methods as suggested by the IMF. The remainder of this paper seeks to promote this 
goal, first by summarising the primary conclusions concerning the promise and limitations of 
a formulary approach from my recently-published analysis, and then by suggesting some 
high-priority topics for follow-up research related to tax base protection for developing 
countries. 
 
 
2  Perceived technical barriers to formulary 
apportionment 
  
Historically debates over the feasibility of international formulary apportionment have focused 
primarily on four topics: 
  
(i)  the possibility that it would lead to double taxation, especially if different countries adopt 
inconsistent formulas;  
(ii)   difficulties associated with the sales factor in apportionment formulas, including both 
difficulties of tracking sales made in electronic commerce, and possible unfavourable 
treatment of developing countries if a formula weights the sales factor especially heavily 
as has occurred in apportionment among US states;  
(iii)  the perceived incompatibility of formulary apportionment with some elements of bilateral 
tax treaties; and 
(iv)  the arguable need for countries to adopt a common tax base to which countries’ 
apportionment formulas would be applied. 
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2.1 Concerns regarding double taxation 
  
Opponents of formulary apportionment have often raised the concern that different countries 
would adopt differing apportionment formulas, just as the different US states have adopted a 
variety of different apportionment formulas for the purpose of domestic income 
apportionment within the US. This, critics contend, would cause double taxation and raise a 
barrier to cross-border investment. 
  
Based on my recently-completed research, however, I am convinced – perhaps counter-
intuitively – that replacing arm’s-length transfer pricing rules with formulary apportionment 
would in fact reduce instances of economically-damaging double taxation, even if different 
countries adopt inconsistent apportionment formulas.7 This is because under current arm’s-
length transfer pricing rules double taxation is unpredictable. Given the subjectivity of the 
current rules, tax authorities from two different countries often make overlapping claims to tax 
income from a taxpayer’s cross-border investment, so that the taxpayer will end up paying 
total tax at an unexpectedly high overall effective rate. Moreover at the time a taxpayer must 
decide whether to make a particular cross-border investment, the taxpayer generally has no 
way of predicting the extent to which the tax authorities will make overlapping claims – a fact 
that infuses these decisions with additional risk. 
  
A taxpayer facing the risk of what might turn out to be unacceptable levels of taxation will be 
less likely to make an investment than a taxpayer that is better able to predict the total 
effective rate at which the investment will be taxed. Currently, therefore, the unpredictability 
of the application in practice of today’s arm’s-length transfer pricing rules may significantly 
inhibit international investment.8 
  
Under a formulary system, even if the two countries in which a taxpayer is considering 
investing apply inconsistent formulas, the investor generally will be able to predict in advance 
of the investment decision the effective rates at which each country will impose its tax. If the 
total effective rate is acceptable, the investor will proceed with the investment; if it is not, the 
taxpayer might seek more tax-friendly countries in which to invest. Most of the uncertainty 
generated by the arm’s-length system will, however, be removed – a factor that should 
encourage cross-border investment generally. 
  
In short it is not double taxation per se that raises barriers to international investment, but 
rather unpredictable double taxation. Formulary apportionment affords taxpayers greater 
certainty about the total effective tax rate than is available under arm’s-length transfer pricing 
rules. Accordingly, and perhaps surprisingly, formulary apportionment is better suited to 
addressing economic damage from double taxation than arm’s-length transfer pricing rules. 
  
2.2 Problems with the sales factor 
  
Over the past several decades US states have increasingly adopted single-factor 
apportionment formulas based on the destination of sales.9 The apparent reason for this 
movement has been tax competition. State governments have been concerned that 
apportioning income in part on other measures of economic activity, such as payroll or 
location of physical plant, discourages investment in employment or construction in the state. 
                                                 
7  This topic is addressed particularly in Durst (2013c). The discussion in that article is based on Durst (2012a) and Durst 
(2012b). 
8  In some situations taxpayers may be able to mitigate the uncertainty raised by arm’s-length pricing rules by obtaining 
advance pricing agreements (APAs) before making investments, or by obtaining relief from double taxation after the fact 
through competent authority negotiations conducted under bilateral tax treaties. However APAs are expensive and 
typically cannot be completed before investment decisions must be made; and competent authority negotiations can 
involve considerable expense and delay, are not always concluded successfully, and are unavailable in cases where 
the countries involved in particular cross-border transactions are not party to a bilateral tax treaty. 
9  For historical discussion of formulary apportionment among the US states, see Durst (2013e). 
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There is every reason to expect that under an international formulary apportionment system 
national governments would gravitate towards a sales-only apportionment formula as the US 
states have done. This prospect raises two different concerns: 
  
(i) In an era of digital commerce it may be difficult to identify the destination of sales of 
various goods and services with sufficient reliability to support sales-based 
apportionment. 
(ii)  Sales-based apportionment might generate undesirable results for some countries, 
especially developing countries in which much income is generated by capital- or labour-
intensive activities, ranging from mineral extraction to providing outsourced business 
services. 
  
The difficulty of determining the destination of sales in today’s digitalised marketplace arises 
under both arm’s-length and formulary systems. Both systems require determining the 
locations in which goods and services are ultimately consumed or otherwise used. 
Challenges arise mainly from three sources: (i) problems in tracing the identity of customers 
in electronic commerce; (ii) current permanent establishment rules, which generally do not 
treat the mere destination of sales as a basis for taxable nexus; and (iii) the ease with which 
taxpayers can route sales destined for high-tax countries through intermediaries in zero- or 
low-tax countries, thereby obscuring the locations in which products or services are actually 
consumed or used. The potential remedies for these difficulties generally are the same under 
both arm’s-length and formulary systems. They are: (i) modifying nexus rules to allow sales-
destination countries to assert claims to income arising from the sales; and (ii) evidentiary 
tests to reduce revenue losses from excessive attribution of sales to intermediaries in zero- 
or low-tax jurisdictions. 
  
In the final instalment of my recently-completed study of formulary apportionment (Durst 
2014a), I suggest an approach that might be used under formulary apportionment to address 
the problem of sales through zero- and low-tax intermediaries. Essentially the suggestion is 
that tax authorities generally accept without detailed examination attribution of sales to most 
jurisdictions, but where sales are attributed to zero- or low-tax countries taxpayers would be 
required to present clear evidence that the goods and services sold were actually used or 
consumed in those countries. This proposed solution is certainly not perfect. It could, 
however, lead to a tolerable level of compliance under a formulary system; indeed it might 
lead to fewer difficulties with respect to intermediary sales under a formulary system than 
currently are posed under arm’s-length rules. 
  
The additional concern, that apportionment based heavily on a sales factor might 
inappropriately reduce developing countries’ share of the global tax base, is important to 
consider. The operations of multinational businesses in developing countries tend to focus 
especially heavily on large inputs of plant and equipment as in mineral extraction, or high 
personnel inputs as in the provision of outsourced services. Often, moreover, products 
manufactured in developing countries are exported, so they do not generate sales in the 
country for purposes of formulary apportionment. Other things being equal, therefore, 
apportionment based only or primarily on sales would appear to reduce developing countries’ 
share of the global tax pie. 
  
The concern that sales-based apportionment will operate adversely with respect to 
developing countries, however, rests on the implicit assumption that countries’ tax rates must 
remain fixed at their current levels. If tax rates are held fixed, then an apportionment formula 
based only on sales would indeed be likely to generate lower tax revenue for many 
developing countries than a formula including as a factor either the value of physical plant or 
an indicator of local employment, or perhaps both. A country is not, however, required to 
maintain its tax rates at a constant level, so a country which stands to lose revenue as a 
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result of a move to sales-based apportionment could make up the shortfall by increasing its 
rates. 
  
Arguably, to apportion a corporate income tax on sales would cause the tax to resemble 
more closely a consumption tax, and therefore could place the economic burden of the tax 
more heavily on consumers than a corporate tax apportioned according to other factors. 
Although determining the ultimate incidence of different forms of tax raises complex 
questions, this concern may be valid. It should be borne in mind, however, that developing 
countries have a pressing need for more revenue than they are currently collecting; to the 
extent the needed revenue cannot be raised from corporate income tax it will need to be 
raised from other sources, unavoidably including consumption taxes. Therefore if sales-
based apportionment constitutes the only realistic means of collecting higher corporate tax 
revenue, a move to sales-based apportionment may represent the most consumer-friendly 
policy despite the likelihood that some of the tax’s incidence will fall on consumers. 
  
2.3 Tax treaty issues 
  
If formulary apportionment is to be implementable without the need for prohibitively complex 
accounting segmentations among taxpayers’ different activities, individual national tax 
authorities should be permitted to apply their apportionment formulas to a comprehensive 
measure of the global combined income of each multinational group that has a member 
subject to tax within the country.10 The alternative would be to follow the practice that has 
arisen in the US, where nexus rules based on the US Constitution permit states to apply their 
apportionment formulas to only a portion of the taxpayer’s nationwide combined income, 
namely the portion that arises from those particular business lines that have factual nexus 
with the particular state.11 For similar reasons investment income is not included in the 
combined income subject to apportionment, but is instead allocated to the taxpayer’s home 
jurisdiction. The result is that formulary apportionment in the US often becomes embroiled in 
disruptive controversy concerning, for example, the boundaries of the particular unitary 
business that has nexus with a particular state, or the distinction between business and 
investment income. I conclude that countries adopting formulary apportionment would be 
well-advised to apply their formulas to all of a taxpayer’s global income, from all sources. 
  
This conclusion, however, raises difficulty under typical income tax treaties. They generally 
entitle countries to assert tax jurisdiction on legal entities operating within the country only 
with respect to income attributable to the entity’s permanent establishment (PE) within the 
country, generally interpreted to mean a physical presence. This limitation might reasonably 
be interpreted as requiring that international formulary apportionment be limited by nexus 
rules similar to those that have been problematic in the US. 
  
A related concern is that income tax treaties typically contain language suggesting that 
income must be apportioned among related legal entities as if they were independent parties 
transacting with one another at arm’s length. It can reasonably be argued that apportioning a 
group’s global combined income according to a formula would not meet this standard. 
  
Accordingly, for formulary apportionment to be implemented efficiently on the basis of 
taxpayers’ global combined income, international tax treaties may need to be modified or 
governments may need to be willing selectively to override the relevant provisions of their 
current tax treaties. Neither of these outcomes is likely unless strong global political support 
arises for formulary apportionment, and this seems unlikely in the near future. Therefore the 
provisions of current income tax treaties may add significantly to the barriers facing the 
                                                 
10  The accounting difficulties arising from attempts to apply formulary apportionment to only a portion of a taxpayer’s 
combined global income are discussed in Durst (2013a, 2013b). 
11  See Durst (2013d). 
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adoption of international formulary apportionment, at least until current political alignments 
with respect to international taxation change markedly. 
 
2.4 Accounting barriers to formulary apportionment  
  
Formulary apportionment will place large and novel accounting demands on corporate 
taxpayers, as well as on the agencies that must audit their tax returns. These demands arise 
largely from the fact that each country has unique rules for translating taxpayers’ ‘book’ (i.e. 
financial statement) income into taxable income.12 To determine a taxpayer’s local taxable 
income, a national tax authority will need a measure of the taxpayer’s global income – the 
income earned by the taxpayer from all sources around the world – that has been translated 
into taxable income according to the locally-applicable tax accounting rules. For example, if a 
taxpayer conducts business in ten different countries, and all of those countries have 
adopted formulary apportionment, the taxpayer might need to make ten separate translations 
of its global book income into taxable income under the different tax accounting rules of all 
ten countries. 
 
This task is complicated by the fact that translating book into taxable income typically 
requires a detailed transaction-by-transaction look at the taxpayer’s activities, since tax 
accounting rules are often activity-specific (e.g. requiring acceleration of income for long-term 
construction contracts, or mark-to-market accounting for some holdings of investment 
instruments). 
  
The need for multiple book-to-tax translations might not be as prohibitive a barrier to 
formulary apportionment as it might initially appear to be. Multinational groups almost 
certainly already collect all the information necessary to accomplish the translations in their 
accounting databases; gearing up to conduct the translations therefore might amount 
primarily to an exercise in computer programming, albeit an expensive one. Although 
categorising some transactions under the applicable rules will require human judgment, the 
translation process should remain primarily electronic and over time companies would likely 
learn to accomplish the task reasonably smoothly. After companies surmount the learning 
curve, the cost of the accounting needed for formulary apportionment might end up being 
less than is now required to implement, document and defend a group’s transfer pricing 
under arm’s-length rules. 
  
For the new accounting practices required for formulary apportionment to be developed, 
however, companies will need to commit willingly to the necessary work. A less-than-full 
commitment is likely to cause endless breakdowns in the accounting system and delays in 
successful implementation of the formulary system. Accordingly, the adoption of formulary 
apportionment on a widespread basis will probably need to wait until much greater support 
develops for it among business leaders. 
  
An alternative means of dealing with the complexities of book-to-tax translations under 
formulary apportionment would be for the countries of the world to adopt a largely uniform tax 
base. Taxpayers doing business in multiple countries then generally would need to convert 
their combined global book income into taxable income only once, just as is required today in 
each country under arm’s-length transfer pricing rules. Countries might even, in connection 
with the adoption of formulary apportionment, take the step of adopting book-tax conformity – 
conforming their tax accounting rules to financial accounting rules - thereby achieving many 
simplifications to their tax systems in addition to smoothing the route to formulary 
apportionment.13 
  
                                                 
12  See the discussion of this topic in Durst (2013a). 
13  For discussion of this topic, see Hanlon and Shevlin (2005). 
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Substantially greater uniformity among countries’ tax accounting systems – even to the point 
of book-tax conformity – seems politically unlikely unless a great deal of support arises 
around the world for a formulary apportionment regime. The many differences among 
contemporary tax accounting regimes have tended to arise from local political 
considerations, and might be politically quite difficult to modify. Moreover trying to establish a 
global norm for tax accounting might be perceived by some countries’ governments as 
infringing on their flexibility in lawmaking, and even on national sovereignty. 
  
In sum, of the major concerns typically raised against formulary apportionment, the need to 
simplify translations of book into tax income constitutes the largest practical impediment. The 
political will necessary to overcome this obstacle is not evident today, so the sensible course 
of action, as the OECD and IMF have advised, is to defer attempts to implement full-scale 
formulary apportionment and instead to draw on various potential remedies for BEPS, some 
of which are derived from principles of formulary apportionment, in order to assist countries 
in controlling base erosion within the overall framework of existing transfer pricing rules. 
 
 
3  High-priority measures for developing 
countries 
 
Summarised below are some measures that draw on apportionment concepts and might 
assist developing countries in curtailing revenue losses to BEPS in the short term. All of 
these measures have been mentioned in one form or another in the OECD’s BEPS work and 
the IMF report on tax spillovers. The measures can be seen as providing a high-priority 
agenda for further research in the field of international taxation for developing countries. 
  
3.1 Curbs on interest deductions 
  
A large proportion of tax avoidance through base erosion relies on interest deductions on 
intra-group loans, with the interest often being paid directly or indirectly to affiliates in zero- or 
low-tax countries. In general, arm’s-length transfer pricing rules are not designed to limit 
companies’ ability to deduct interest paid to related parties. Transfer pricing rules typically 
are concerned with whether the interest rates charged on these loans exceed market rates, 
not whether there is a genuine business purpose for the related-party financing. Accordingly, 
measures in addition to improvements to the transfer pricing rules will be needed to curtail 
base erosion through interest payments. 
  
Experience around the world suggests that even fairly simple limitations on interest 
deductibility might have material benefit. Currently, as part of its BEPS project, the OECD is 
engaged in an intensive study of possible best practice for limitations on interest deductions; 
the study seems geared towards identifying measures that should be of value to countries at 
varying stages of economic development (OECD 2014d). The OECD has emphasised that 
measures to limit interest deductions should be adopted by as wide a range of countries as 
possible in order to counteract the effect of tax competition, which historically appears to 
have inhibited countries from adopting effective deduction limitations on a unilateral basis 
OECD 2014d: 8). The approach being explored by the OECD has a number of what could be 
called formulary elements – deductions would be apportioned among entities based on either 
their relative value of assets or level of income. The OECD apparently is comfortable 
exploring a formulary approach in the limited context of interest apportionment because the 
accounting difficulties of the formulary approach, which the OECD discussion draft explores 
at length, should be more manageable in this context than in a more comprehensive regime 
of formulary apportionment. 
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3.2 Hybrid transfer pricing methods 
  
Currently transfer pricing practice around the world depends heavily on the OECD’s 
transactional net margin method (TNMM), generally referred to as the comparable profits 
method (CPM) under US practice. In a TNMM analysis the net income of a taxpayer affiliate 
in a particular country is supposed to be benchmarked against that of comparable companies 
which are not themselves part of multinational groups, operating in the same markets. 
Consider, for example, Distribco – a soft drink distributor that is part of a multinational group 
with a parent in Northland – which distributes beverages in Southland, a developing country. 
Distribco pays a royalty for using the group’s trademark to an intangibles holding company 
that the group maintains in a zero-tax country. Under TNMM the tax authority of Southland is 
supposed to compare the profitability of the distributor, after paying the royalty, against the 
profitability of independent distributors of soft drinks (or perhaps similar products) that also 
operate in Southland. If the taxpayer’s income in Southland is at least as high as that of the 
identified comparables, the taxpayer’s transfer pricing results are accepted as arm’s-length. 
  
Based on my experience with TNMM, I believe its widespread use is largely attributable to 
the appearance of scientific precision provided by the computerised nature of the TNMM 
analysis. In many cases, however, using TNMM is conceptually inappropriate and effectively 
permits large amounts of profit shifting. 
  
Where TNMM provides inappropriate results, the failure is usually attributable to either or 
both of the two factors mentioned above. First, the method is based on the implicit 
assumption that the local affiliate of a multinational group typically could expect at arm’s 
length to earn only a limited routine return from its activities. For example, TNMM 
incorporates the implicit assumption that the local distributor of a multinational group’s 
products is entitled merely to compensation for the bare services of taking orders and 
delivering products to buyers. Any additional income earned from sales of the products in the 
particular market is assumed typically to be attributable to brand volume that the parent 
group has built, and is allowed to be compensated by royalties. Similarly, when TNMM 
historically has been applied to developing country manufacturing and service operations of 
a multinational group, the practice has been to reject implicitly the idea that special features 
of the local consumer or labour market that might be seen as increasing the multinational 
group’s profitability in the market – such as the presence of rapidly-increasing consumer 
demand (sometimes called a market intangible) or the availability of a highly productive work 
force at relatively low rates of compensation (sometimes called location savings) – should be 
seen as income of the local affiliate of the group rather than the group’s parent. The tax 
authorities of some developing countries, particularly the most economically powerful ones, 
are challenging the practice of treating income from market intangibles and location savings 
in this manner, but still around the world taxpayers typically apply TNMM to minimise the 
income that is attributable to local subsidiaries, and therefore to maximise the amount of 
income that can be shifted away from local subsidiaries through various kinds of related-
party payments. 
  
A second problem with TNMM, especially as the method is applied in developing countries, 
is that information on ‘uncontrolled comparables’ that would be necessary to apply the 
method effectively is often not available. First, multinational groups often conduct activities 
that are significantly different – in scale as well as the level of risk involved – from those 
conducted by independent companies. Second, the stock of many independent companies is 
not publicly traded, so their financial data is not contained in the commercially-available 
databases. The result is that the typical transfer pricing analysis under TNMM relies on small 
sample sizes from inexact comparables. The sample sizes are too small to permit valid 
statistical analysis, and the ranges of results (usually in practice based on the interquartile 
range between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the data) are, in the author’s experience, too 
wide to be of much use in tax administration. For example, a typical TNMM analysis might 
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suggest that the arm’s-length profit margin for a distributor in a particular country extends 
from 1 per cent to 3 per cent. This means that a distributor with a sales volume of, say, $10 
million will be considered to comply with the arm’s-length principle if it earns anywhere from 
$100,000 to $400,000 per year – a range of uncertainty far too wide to support credible tax 
enforcement.14 
  
In short, the practical value in tax administration of TNMM based on searches of publicly-
available financial data is considerably less than is sometimes thought. Given its relative 
simplicity, TNMM may be appropriate for identifying large income understatements by small 
local affiliates of multinational groups performing relatively simple kinds of business activities. 
In more demanding situations, however, developing countries will need to use methods that 
offer the relative simplicity of TNMM, but are capable of producing more economically-
realistic results. 
  
Of the transfer pricing methods currently in use around the world the most obvious candidate 
is the profit split method, under which income from a particular economic activity of a 
multinational group is divided among group members according to their relative contribution 
to the group’s activity. More frequent use of profit split methods might benefit developing 
countries, allowing them both to avoid searches for comparables and to establish the case 
for greater margins being attributed to operations in their countries, thereby reducing revenue 
losses from profit shifting. 
  
A number of different kinds of profit split method are currently used around the world.15 The 
type of profit split likely to be most useful to developing countries is the overall profit split, 
sometimes called the contribution-analysis profit split, in which profits are divided in a one-
step process among participants based on their relative contributions. This contrasts with the 
residual profit split, in which as a first step TNMM returns are assigned to participants’ 
perceived routine activities, and then the remaining profit is divided based on relative 
contributions. The residual approach involves relying to some extent on comparables data, 
and also involves the difficult task of separating group members’ activities into routine and 
non-routine components. An overall profit split, on the other hand, does not require 
identifying comparables, nor does it require trying to distinguish between routine and non-
routine activities. 
  
For overall profit splits to serve as the workhorse of developing country transfer pricing 
regimes, however, it will be necessary to solve two important problems that historically have 
hampered the application of profit splits. First, the OECD Guidelines, perhaps seeking to 
avoid the perception of endorsing a formulary approach, state strongly that profit splits must 
be designed on a case-by-case basis, according to a detailed economic analysis of each 
taxpayer’s facts and circumstances. Although perhaps appealing in theory, this individualised 
approach lends substantial subjectivity and unpredictability to the design of profit splits and 
also requires expenditure of time and resources, by taxpayers and tax administrations alike, 
which are disproportionate to any degree of persuasiveness actually added to the method by 
the extended economic analysis. This difficulty is likely to be especially severe in the 
resource-limited context of developing country tax administration. As a practical matter, if the 
profit split method is to be used reasonably efficiently by developing country tax 
administrations, some level of uniformity will need to be tolerated in the application of the 
method to different taxpayers operating in the same industry.  
 
In addition, for profit splits to be effective in controlling base erosion, they will need to 
apportion income to different parties not according to the parties’ mere levels of expenditure 
                                                 
14  This statistical phenomenon is discussed in Durst (2013c) and in Durst and Culbertson (2003). 
15  The various profit splits in use today are described in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD n.d.), beginning with paragraph 2.118. 
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in supporting the group’s income-producing activities, but instead according to the business 
activities actually performed by the parties. In practice many profit splits have apportioned 
income according to the parties’ mere expenditure of cash, and therefore have contributed to 
the proliferation of BEPS transactions. It will be necessary to change this practice if profit 
splits are to be useful as a tool against BEPS – but the change will be perceived as a 
substantial one and is bound to elicit political opposition. 
  
In short, designing a hybrid transfer pricing method for use by developing countries in 
addressing BEPS will require significant modification of both the TNMM and profit split 
paradigms under existing transfer pricing methods.16 It is to be hoped that the IMF, OECD 
and other expert bodies will continue to address this issue as their BEPS-related work 
proceeds. 
  
3.3 Excise taxes 
 
For some complex industries, the complexity of the transfer pricing rules will almost certainly 
exceed the enforcement capacities of national tax administrations. For example, 
telecommunications carriers, including cellular service providers, engage in a virtually 
untraceable network of transactions with related and unrelated parties for roaming services 
and call completion and origination. Similarly banks and insurance companies engage in 
such large volumes of related-party transactions – such as loans, derivatives transactions 
and reinsurance arrangements – that transfer pricing analysis is effectively impossible. Even 
local distribution, manufacturing and service-provider affiliates of multinational groups, whose 
transactions are less complicated, present a challenge because they are numerous and it is 
difficult to locate appropriate comparables. For these circumstances countries may wish to 
consider an excise tax in place of a corporate income tax.17 
 
Telecom providers, banks and insurance companies, for example, might be exempted from 
income taxation in return for increases in existing excise taxes on telecoms 
charges, bank fees and insurance premiums. In addition, a country might impose a small 
excise tax on manufactured and distributed products in lieu of an income tax on taxpayers 
that are engaged only in manufacturing or distribution activities. Designing and implementing 
excise taxes will require careful analysis and drafting, but the basic structural elements of 
excise taxes are well known around the world. Administration of these taxes would require 
only measurement of local sales revenue; the remainder of the extensive fact-finding and 
detailed economic analysis currently required under transfer pricing rules generally should 
not be necessary. It seems likely that substituting excise for income taxes in some situations 
where income tax administration is especially problematic could assist developing countries 
in raising increased revenue at relatively modest administrative expense. 
 
 
4  Conclusion 
  
In the course of their recent work, both the OECD and IMF have accurately pointed to 
unresolved deficiencies in today’s arm’s-length transfer pricing rules, including the tendency 
of those rules, as they have historically been applied, to enable profit shifting. Successfully 
Implemented, international formulary apportionment could largely curtail BEPS. However a 
formulary system is not feasible in the near future owing to unresolved technical questions 
and strong political opposition. For the present, developing countries and the international 
agencies that advise them should consider measures to: 
                                                 
16  For one suggested approach see the author’s suggestion for fashioning a transfer pricing method using the format of 
TNMM, but basing the method on group rather than separate entity profitability, in Durst (2015). 
17  See Durst (2014d). 
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(i)  effectively limit related-party interest deductions; 
(ii)  develop more effective transfer pricing methods under the arm’s-length paradigm; and 
(iii)  supplement excise taxes for corporate income taxation where effective transfer pricing 
enforcement is highly impracticable. 
 
These tasks raise significant technical as well as political challenges. Solving them will 
require considerable international cooperation, including the involvement of groups such as 
the IMF, World Bank and OECD. In addition developing country governments will need to 
generate the political will to implement these and other means of protecting their tax bases 
against erosion, notwithstanding the political pressures of tax competition; and multinational 
businesses and their home-country governments will need to exercise political and economic 
restraint and limit opposition to developing countries’ efforts to increase their tax collection on 
income from inbound investment, at least until such time as the developing countries are in a 
better position to raise needed revenue from domestic sources. 
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